

# A most dangerous game: International cooperation to limit climate change



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
**École polytechnique**

Amphi. Becquerel

**16h 00**

Départements de Mécanique

**D**espite an unprecedented diplomatic effort, concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased year upon year. Countries have pledged to avoid dangerous climate change, but their actions virtually guarantee that they will breach the limit they say must not be breached. Why is this and what will be the consequences should climate diplomacy continue to fail? I will explain using simple game theory why cooperation has failed, why the Paris Agreement will achieve little, and how we might possibly do better. I will also speculate on the consequences should our efforts to stimulate cooperation continue to falter.



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